Russia and Iran Strategic Partnership Agreement Part II.

Leading up to the 2024 agreement

Yesterday, I wrote about the 2001 Treaty of Mutual Relations between Russia and Iran. Initially set for ten years, it has since been automatically renewed every five years. The treaty’s framework served as the foundation for their relationship, which has evolved considerably over time. By 2019, as then-Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Moscow, both nations acknowledged that this aging agreement no longer reflected the deepening ties between Moscow and Tehran. An update was clearly overdue.

The election of Ebrahim Raisi in 2021 accelerated these discussions. Nearly every high-level meeting between Russian and Iranian officials included references to a new long-term agreement that would formalize their growing partnership. While Iranian officials eagerly portrayed the document as transformative, promising to cement relations for decades, Moscow remained less enthusiastic—at least at first.

Updating an Outdated Accord

In January 2022, just one month before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Raisi made his first official visit to Moscow. One of Iran’s primary goals during this visit was to advance negotiations on the treaty. Raisi handed over a draft of a 20-year cooperation agreement, signaling Iran’s eagerness to cement its partnership with Russia.

“We in Iran have no limits for expanding ties with Russia,” Raisi declared during a lengthy three-hour meeting at the Kremlin. The optics made it seem like there were limits, with Raisi and Putin seated at opposite ends of Putin’s famously long table. Moreover, the two leaders were not entirely aligned on the nature of their future relationship.

After their meeting, President Raisi rearticulated Iran’s position that relations with Russia would be “strong and comprehensive … not short term or positional, but permanent and strategic.” The rhetoric from the Russian side was more restrained. Putin conspicuously refrained from employing the term “strategic” to describe their bilateral relations. Instead, he merely stated Russia’s desire to “create a long-term foundation for cooperation” with Iran.

At the time, Russia was in no rush to formalize the agreement with Iran. For Moscow, there was little immediate need to upgrade the existing partnership. Historically, Russia has been cautious in its relations with Iran, refraining from labeling them as “strategic” to avoid antagonizing key regional players like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the UAE. However, the outbreak of war in Ukraine just weeks later altered Russia’s calculus.

A New Era of Partnership

When Raisi and Putin met again in June 2022 on the sidelines of the Caspian Summit in Ashgabat, the dynamics of their relationship had shifted dramatically, as had Russia’s priorities. By this point, Russia’s war in Ukraine was faltering. Ukrainian forces had mounted a fierce resistance, and Russia’s military was bogged down with logistical issues and strategic missteps.

In the past, Iranian press releases often portrayed the relationship between the two countries as particularly close, sometimes exaggerating the extent of cooperation. However, in Ashgabat, it was Russia that seemed eager to emphasize the depth of their partnership. During his meeting with Raisi, Putin described Russia-Iran relations as “of a deep strategic nature,” emphasizing the constant interaction between the two nations in political, security, and economic spheres.

Behind the scenes, Russia found itself turning to Tehran for military support—specifically, drones. Historically, Russia dominated its arms trade relationship with Iran, serving as Tehran’s primary military supplier. However, the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions disrupted Russia’s ability to replenish key weapons, forcing Moscow to turn to Iran for support. The relationship was changing but progress on the agreement seemed to remain stagnant.

Throughout 2022 and 2023, negotiations on the updated agreement continued. Almost every month, there would be a statement from an Iranian or Russian official about the nearing finalization of this new agreement. However, Iran began to stall the progress of negotiations, using its newfound leverage to push Moscow into offering better terms. Emboldened by Russia’s growing dependence on its military aid, Iran saw an opportunity to extract more concessions from Moscow in treaty negotiations. Tehran was no longer satisfied with vague promises of cooperation; it wanted concrete guarantees of deeper military and economic ties, as well as greater Russian commitment to supporting Iran’s regional interests.

In May 2024, Raisi’s death further complicated negotiations. With snap presidential elections scheduled for June, there seemed to be a consensus in Iran to pause the talks until a new administration could reassess the terms. This pause, they argued, would give Iran greater flexibility in shaping a more advantageous deal, particularly as Russia’s military entanglements in Ukraine deepened and its reliance on Tehran increased.

This delay led to diplomatic tensions, with conflicting narratives emerging from both sides. In June 2024, Zamir Kabulov, Head of the Russian Foreign Ministries Second Asia Department, lamented that the progress on the treaty has been “halted due to issues faced by our Iranian partners.” This public statement by Kabulov appeared to be a calculated move by the Russians, using media outlets to apply pressure on Tehran by suggesting Iran was responsible for the delay.

Later, Iran’s ambassador to Russia denied this and accused the Iranian media of “mistranslating” Russian media reports that Iran had suspended the process. Adding to the multitude of narratives, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that several “procedural legislative actions” must be completed before the agreement can be signed. The back-and-forth between officials, playing out through statements in state-led media from both sides, would continue until Iran finally elected a new president.

All Roads Lead to Kazan?

Following a closely contested run-off, Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president on July 5th. Three days after his election, Putin called Pezeshkian to congratulate him. During this call, it appears that Putin proposed finalizing the long-awaited Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement at the BRICS summit in Kazan in October. The next day, Pezeshkian announced that “[The] documents on the comprehensive cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia have been prepared. We are ready to sign it on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia…We attach great importance to relations with Russia, our friend and neighbor, and will undoubtedly strengthen these relations.”

Adding weight to the likelihood of the agreement materializing, in September 2019, President Vladimir Putin approved the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Tehran, calling it “expedient” and emphasizing that it should be signed “at the highest level.” This approval signaled the formal intent for the agreement to be ratified by the Russian Duma, moving the process forward with legislative backing.

In October, ten days after Iran launched 200 ballistic missiles at Israel, Putin and Pezeshkian held their first bilateral meeting in Ashgabat. Up until the meeting, it was pretty much established that the agreement would be signed in Kazan on October 22-24. However, shortly after the meeting, Iran’s Ambassador to Russia declared a change in venue, noting that “the two presidents agreed at a meeting in Ashgabat that it would be concluded during bilateral visits. In this regard, Mr. Putin invited Pezeshkian to visit Moscow.” Why the change in venue? There are two views on this. Mine is that the Iranian’s did not want to be relegated to level of diplomacy reserved for MoUs and declarations - since this is significant agreement. Another view is that the Russians wanted to have it at a higher profile venue. Who knows.

Follow for my next post, maybe later tonight, I’ll write about what will likely be in the agreement and compare it to previous Strategic Partnership Agreements that the Russian have signed (since the Russian MFA loves to copy and paste treaties).